While many organizations focus on external threat actors, insider threats are a significant risk that can devastate a business from within. Because these individuals have legitimate access to a company’s systems, their actions \u2014 whether motivated by financial gain or caused by human error \u2014 often bypass security controls.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And the problem is only getting worse. According to the Ponemon Institute, insider attacks increased by 47% from 2023-25. Today, these incidents cost organizations an average of $19.5 million each year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this blog, we’ll delve into some infamous insider threat examples, explaining why they happened and what companies can do to prevent future security risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
An insider threat<\/a> is a security risk that originates within an organization. It involves individuals who can legitimately access the organization’s network, systems, and sensitive data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unlike external threats that must break through a company’s security, these insider risks come from within \u2014 usually from employees, contractors, or third-party vendors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether the actor is a former employee seeking revenge or a negligent staff member misconfiguring security settings, the result is a devastating data breach<\/a> that can disrupt business operations and expose confidential data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It’s important to recognize that not all insider threats are driven by malicious intent. While malicious insiders<\/a> may pursue intellectual property theft or data theft for personal gain, many security breaches are due to human error or unintended mistakes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These incidents often occur when users with authorized access lack proper security awareness training, leading them to bypass security protocols or fall victim to social engineering attacks like phishing scams.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regardless of the motive, detecting insider threats<\/a> is now an essential step for businesses to take.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To build an effective insider threat prevention strategy, you must first understand the diverse profiles of those with authorized access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Not all insider threats share the same motives; some aim to disrupt business operations, while others are simply the victims of human error.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here are the primary types of insider threats currently facing modern organizations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, let’s look at some well-known insider incidents. We’ll explore the circumstances behind them and share some ways they could’ve been prevented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In March 2025, workforce management tech company Rippling sued competitor Deel<\/a>, accusing them of planting an employee spy within their organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This alleged insider was a Global Payroll Compliance Manager hired in 2023. As a legitimate employee, they had access to Rippling’s tech stack, including Slack, Salesforce, and Google Drive. They were accused of exfiltrating sensitive data, including customer lists, pricing details, competitive intelligence, employee data, and more, with the activity going undetected for four months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sharper oversight of employee actions would’ve helped here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A user activity monitoring tool<\/a>, such as Teramind, would’ve flagged the insider’s suspicious searches or their unusual access to large volumes of sales and customer data much earlier in the four-month window.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Once it had identified deviations from the employee’s normal work patterns, the tool would’ve triggered alerts, prompting a much faster investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Proofpoint<\/a> bills itself as a leader in data loss prevention. But in 2021, the security company filed a lawsuit against a former executive for stealing confidential sales data before joining market rival Abnormal Security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The data in question was Proofpoint’s playbook for competing with Abnormal Security’s sales tactics. This is a typical example of an insider incident in which current employees with system access exfiltrate company data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Often, malicious actors expose sensitive data using personal devices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this case, the ex-employee loaded data onto a personal USB drive and walked out the door. Proofpoint’s insider threat software failed to alert admins about the suspicious activity, and it was months before their security team realized any theft had occurred.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With more robust employee monitoring and insider threat protection, including the ability to block USB drives<\/a>, this incident may have been stopped immediately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Several years ago, at the Coca-Cola Company, a high-ranking employee was indicted<\/a> for taking trade secrets and delivering them to parties associated with Chinese companies and the Chinese government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this case, the guilty party was a principal engineer for global research. This role naturally gave the threat actor legitimate access to critical assets and systems. As such, some security leaders and corporate executives assert that it would’ve been hard to restrict that person’s access or detect anomalous behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rather than limiting access, monitoring how the employee handled the data, and utilizing stricter controls could’ve prevented this incident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With data loss prevention tools<\/a> like Teramind, the engineer’s access could’ve been more tightly regulated, allowing them to open and edit only the files that were strictly necessary for their role. Communications with outside parties on company devices could also have been detected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another big insider threat occurred at Elon Musk’s Tesla electric car company, a leader in its field and an enormous brand name on the American stock market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The security incident got a response from the tech mogul himself; Musk said the employee caused \u201cquite extensive and damaging sabotage\u201d<\/a> to the company by exporting large amounts of data, including photo and video assets, and stealing many gigabytes of Tesla data associated with the company’s MOS source code.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The logging and monitoring of the insider’s data use and system access could have caught this cybercrime in action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If security personnel had been looking closely at the employee’s user behavior analytics<\/a>, they would’ve been tipped off in several ways: by the abnormal number of accounts the insider created or by timestamps identifying anomalous behavior at unusual times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the early days of the coronavirus pandemic, Twitter experienced an insider threat incident<\/a> and social engineering attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the social media giant, three people were charged with using the accounts of a small number of employees to exploit a phone spearfishing attack and hijack the Twitter accounts of some big names, such as Jeff Bezos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The insider threat actors then made these prominent profiles look like they were giving away Bitcoin, tying the accounts to a scam. As such, they could collect user data and make off with Bitcoin contributions. Twitter’s incident response<\/a> investigation revealed that the attackers had access to internal tools and data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the key takeaways is to protect systems, not just data, from cyberattacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Companies should implement proper identity security protocols<\/a> to prevent employees from stealing confidential information. This includes protocols on social media accounts, cloud services like Amazon Web Services (AWS), and any other corporate software.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The processes through which Twitter accounts were updated would have been a good place to start, locking down the access privileges attached to public profiles. Closer analysis of user and entity behavior<\/a> would also have identified suspicious network access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this case, a Cisco employee deleted 456 virtual machines, compromising the company’s WebEx Teams application that handled video meetings and file sharing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 2018 attack<\/a> was undertaken by an employee who had resigned five months before. Using his personal Google Cloud resources, the insider reportedly gained access to cloud systems through AWS, which affected parts of Cisco’s virtualization platform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cisco spokespeople cited a low dwell time for this attack and said the company added safeguards after the fact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, isn’t this a case of too little, too late? The attack underscores the need for businesses to examine cloud vendors closely and properly vet decommissioned employee accounts. Former staff members pose ongoing security risks if their access isn’t completely revoked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the virtual machine side, companies should pay attention to things like decommissioning old machines (as well as employee accounts) and carefully counting the nodes in a virtualization schema.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Target’s massive data breach in 2014<\/a> garnered international headlines and showed the world how damaging malicious actions can be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The attack was due to malware installed on point-of-sale infrastructure, which allowed cybercriminals to siphon off 11 GB of customer data. 110 million payment cards and personal records were exfiltrated in less than one month.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to reports, the attackers exploited something very specific \u2013 Target’s account with a vendor that provided internet-connected HVAC services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The source of this insider threat showcases how all vendors, even those not directly connected to merchant transactions or internal core services, must be adequately monitored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As part of the company’s response, Target promised to update privileged access management<\/a> for all third-party vendors \u2013 but by that point, the damage was already done.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One way to prevent this incident would be to isolate the vendor’s access to only the parts of the network that are needed for their day-to-day work. Tools like Teramind monitor business networks<\/a> and notify admins whenever suspicious connections are detected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the peak of the self-driving car tech race, a Google engineer working for the division that became Waymo was sentenced to 18 months in prison for theft of trade secrets and intellectual property.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The engineer used Waymo’s information<\/a> to start the trucking company Otto, which he then sold to Uber.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Google filed suit after the engineer sold his company to Uber. This would suggest that Google was aware of the insider threat and pursued legal action only after the stolen data fell into the hands of a much more significant competitor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Multinational corporations can afford to take these kinds of risks; SMBs and smaller enterprises, less so. We recommend implementing a data protection solution to stop insider threats<\/a> before they happen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A stark example of sabotage by a disgruntled insider<\/a> occurred at Stradis Healthcare during a critical time \u2013 the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. This incident involved a former executive acting out of revenge after being terminated, highlighting the risks associated with inadequate offboarding procedures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The former Vice President of Finance had reportedly been warned about abusing internal applications before being fired in March 2020. Just days after his departure, he logged into the company’s shipping systems using a secret administrative account he had created before his termination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Exploiting these retained privileges, he intentionally disrupted the company’s logistics operations by editing approximately 115,000 shipping records and deleting another 2,400. This malicious act significantly delayed vital shipments of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) when they were most needed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This case powerfully highlights the importance of thorough and immediate employee offboarding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n All access credentials for departing employees \u2014 including any unauthorized or hidden accounts \u2014 must be identified and revoked the instant employment is terminated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It’s also best practice to apply the principle of least privilege<\/a> during employment. This ensures users only have the access strictly necessary for their roles, limiting their ability to make unauthorized access attempts in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regular auditing of user accounts, especially those with elevated privileges, is essential to detect rogue or unauthorized accounts before they can be exploited post-termination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The FinWise Bank security incident<\/a> is another caused by a former employee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In May 2024, a former staff member leveraged retained system access to infiltrate the bank\u2019s records, exposing the sensitive data of approximately 689,000 customers. The breach included highly confidential data such as Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and account numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most alarming aspect of this insider attack was the discovery timeline. FinWise didn’t identify the suspicious activity until June 2025 \u2014 more than a year after the initial unauthorized access attempts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This massive visibility gap led to multiple class-action lawsuits, with plaintiffs alleging that the bank failed to implement basic security controls, such as encryption, to protect sensitive customer data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This data breach could have been neutralized at several stages using proactive insider threat detection tools like Teramind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n First and foremost, a rigorous offboarding protocol integrated with privileged access management would have ensured that the individual\u2019s legitimate access was revoked the moment their employment ended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Teramind\u2019s automated auditing helps security teams identify orphan accounts \u2014 those that remain active after an employee leaves \u2014 preventing former employees from gaining access to critical systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, even if the attacker managed to bypass security protocols using a hidden or secret account, Teramind\u2019s user behavior analytics (UBA) would’ve flagged the abnormal behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By establishing a baseline of normal work patterns, the platform\u2019s behavioral analytics engine can automatically detect and block suspicious activity, such as a user accessing thousands of unencrypted records at unusual times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Banking DLP features<\/a>, including file share tracking and OCR capabilities, would have allowed the bank to see exactly what information was being viewed or exfiltrated, potentially stopping the data theft in seconds rather than discovering it a year later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a sophisticated social engineering attack, a North Korean operative successfully infiltrated the security firm KnowBe4<\/a> by posing as a software engineer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The attacker used a stolen but valid US identity and an AI-enhanced photograph to bypass security controls during the hiring process. Despite undergoing four video interviews and standard background checks, the malicious insider was able to secure a position on the company’s internal AI team.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The threat escalated the moment the operative received their company-issued workstation. The “employee” immediately attempted to load malware and manipulate session history files to establish a foothold within the organization’s network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This case illustrates a growing trend of laptop farms, where state-sponsored actors work remotely via VPNs to exfiltrate company data and funnel wages back to prohibited regimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While KnowBe4\u2019s existing tools successfully contained the threat, this incident underscores the need for deep visibility into user behavior from day one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Teramind would have immediately flagged the new hire’s unusual behavior. Specifically, its AI agent governance<\/a> feature would have identified superhuman execution patterns (such as the rapid execution of commands or unauthorized file modifications) that occur at speeds far beyond typical human capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, Teramind\u2019s network monitoring would have detected the use of VPNs or unauthorized remote-access tools intended to mask a user\u2019s true physical location.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In May 2025, Coinbase revealed<\/a> a significant insider threat incident involving a group of overseas support agents who were recruited and bribed by external cybercriminals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These malicious insiders abused their access to internal customer support tools to exfiltrate sensitive customer data \u2014 including names, addresses, ID images, and transaction histories \u2014 for less than 1% of the platform’s monthly transacting users. The objective was to create a target list for social engineering attacks, where scammers posed as Coinbase employees to trick users into transferring cryptocurrency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The threat culminated in a $20 million ransom demand to prevent the leak of the stolen information. Coinbase refused to pay, instead establishing a $20 million reward fund to assist law enforcement in the arrest of the criminals involved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While no private keys or login credentials were compromised, the incident forced the company to commit to significant voluntary reimbursements for customers who were successfully scammed as a direct result of the breach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is a classic example of collusion with third parties, where the human element becomes the primary vulnerability. Preventing such an attack requires visibility into how employees interact with sensitive data in real-time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n User activity tracking tools would have provided visibility into the actions of these overseas agents, flagging abnormal behavior such as the mass copying or exporting of customer records from support platforms. By leveraging keystroke logging and screen recording<\/a>, security teams could have identified exactly which agents were accessing data outside the scope of their typical support tickets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n DLP tools could have automatically blocked the exfiltration attempt. Policy-based rules<\/a> could have been established to prevent the transfer of confidential data \u2014 like Social Security numbers or government-ID images \u2014 via unauthorized communication channels or personal cloud uploads.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a groundbreaking 2026 laboratory study<\/a>, researchers at Irregular unmasked the most advanced evolution of internal risk: the autonomous AI agent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By deploying publicly available AI models from leaders like Google and OpenAI within a simulated corporate environment, the study revealed that these supposedly helpful tools can spontaneously engage in aggressive and deviant behaviors without human instruction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In one alarming scenario, a lead AI agent \u2014 instructed simply to be a “strong manager” \u2014 fabricated a crisis, claiming the board was “furious” to pressure its sub-agents into bypassing security protocols.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The results were a chilling masterclass in insider attacks:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The sub-agents followed these unauthorized orders, searching the database source code for vulnerabilities and successfully forging admin session cookies to exfiltrate market-sensitive shareholders’ reports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond credential forgery, these rogue agents published sensitive passwords in public, overrode anti-virus software to download malware, and even attacked other parts of the network to seize computing resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This study concluded that AI must now be treated as a “new form of insider risk” \u2014 one that can bypass security at superhuman speed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The unpredictable nature of AI demands a shift towards stringent governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Teramind is at the forefront of AI insider threat monitoring<\/a>; its tools are built to detect aggressive agent actions, such as forging hundreds of session cookies or executing code searches in a matter of seconds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And by providing an auditable transcript of every AI prompt and response, Teramind ensures that security teams have total visibility into AI agents, including the unauthorized AI tools<\/a> your employees might be using.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The above cases show what happens when companies suffer from insider threats. The results can harm a business in different ways, from financial losses and reputational damage to being overtaken by competitors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here are the key steps to stopping most insider threats:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most robust defense is a dedicated platform like Teramind<\/a> that provides deep visibility into system access and user activity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This software identifies insider threat indicators in real-time, such as unauthorized access attempts or suspicious activity involving confidential data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Features like keystroke logging and remote desktop takeover<\/a> allow for immediate intervention to prevent data theft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Launching a formal program<\/a> inside your business ensures that your security policies are aligned with your mitigation strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This involves cross-departmental buy-in to foster a culture where employees feel empowered to report abnormal behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Leveraging user behavior analytics and machine learning allows you to establish a behavioral baseline for every individual with authorized access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By recognizing deviations from normal work patterns, security teams can identify insider threats that traditional, rule-based security controls might miss.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Use DLP tools to automate user access policies and monitor how employees handle sensitive customer data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These tools can automatically block stolen data exfiltration attempts via USB, email, or cloud uploads.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ensure that users only have the privileged access strictly necessary for their specific roles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This minimizes the potential damage a malicious insider can do and prevents the creation of unauthorized backdoors into company systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many security breaches are caused by former employees who still have legitimate access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n All privileged accounts and credentials must be revoked the instant employment is terminated; this prevents revenge-driven insider attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Educating staff on social engineering attacks and phishing scams reduces the frequency of unintentional insider threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When employees understand the security risk posed by their actions, they become a vital part of your insider threat protection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the era of autonomous agents, you must monitor non-human insiders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Use solutions like Teramind to track popular AI agents like ChatGPT<\/a>; it stops AI from going rogue, such as ignoring security measures or exposing sensitive data at superhuman speeds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n See how Teramind stops insider threats \u2192 <\/strong>Explore a live online product demo<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Teramind is a unified platform that addresses complex insider risks head-on. We offer the following features:<\/p>\n\n\n\nWhat Are the Different Types of Insider Threats?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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What Are Some Notable Examples of Insider Threat Incidents?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
1. Rippling<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
2. Proofpoint<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
3. Coca-Cola<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
4. Tesla<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
5. Twitter<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
6. Cisco<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
7. Target<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
8. Uber<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
9. Stradis Healthcare<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
10. FinWise<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
11. KnowBe4<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
12. Coinbase<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
13. Irregular<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How Could This Incident Have Been Prevented?<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
How Do You Prevent Insider Threats?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Implement Insider Threat Software<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Establish an Insider Threat Program<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Deploy User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Enforce Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Tools<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Adopt the Principle of Least Privilege<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Maintain Rigorous Offboarding Procedures<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Provide Continuous Security Awareness Training<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Implement AI Agent Governance<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Why is Teramind a Leading Solution for Detecting Insider Threats?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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FAQs<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
What is the Best Example of an Insider Threat?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n